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FEDERAL INCOME TAX: THE DILEMMA OF
THE CASUALTY LOSS DEDUCTION
THE PURPOSE OF MITIGATING the sharply progressive rate of taxation
with a corresponding system of deduction is frustrated if the applicabil-
ity of a given deduction is not made certain by statutory language or
judicial construction. A significant example is found in the deduction
allowed the individual taxpayer for non-business casualty losses.'
OTHER CASUALTY
The 1913 code allowed a deduction for losses to non-business or
non-income producing property resulting from fire, shipwreck, or
storm.' In 1916 the statute was amended to add the words "or other
casualty."'  Congress has never attempted to define the term "other
casualty," and efforts to determine its scope have resulted in consider-
able litigation. Early decisions applying the doctrine of ejusdem
generis allowed a deduction only if the loss resulted from a force similar
to fire, storm, or shipwreck.4 For example, in Charles N. Burch' the
taxpayer was denied a deduction because damage to his automobile
resulting from a traffic accident was deemed not to be within the
general classification of "other casualty" as qualified by fire, storm,
or shipwreck.6 This strict construction of the statute was repudiated
in Shearer v. Anderson,' which allowed a casualty loss deduction for
damage to an automoible that overturned on an icy highway. Con-
ceivably, the deduction could have been permitted as indirect storm
damage. However, the court rejected the Government's contention
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § .65 (c)(3)-
2 Ch. x6, §IIB, 38 Stat. 167.
' Ch. 463, § 5 (a) (4), 39 Stat. 759.
'E.g., Daniel F. Ebbert, 9 B.T.A. 1402 (1928); Fred J. Hughes, x B.T.A. 944
(1925). And even in more recent cases, the doctrine of ejusdem generis has been adhere
to when the court has sought to deny a deduction. Gilbert Formel, 19 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 710 (195o); Edgar F. Stevens, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 693 (x94-7) W. W.
Bercaw, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 28 (194).
54 B.T.A. 604 (1926).
' The court in Butch stated that the question had been settled by Clinton Graham,
i B.T.A. 775 (.925).
16 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1927). The Shearer decision was followed in W. S.
Bronson, 9 B.T.A. xoo8 (1927), in which the Board of Tax Appeals expressly over-
ruled its prior decisions in Clinton Graham, supra note 6 and Charles N. Burch, 4
B.T.A. 604 (1926).
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that the deduction was barred by the doctrine of ejusdem generis,
holding that the doctrine pertained to the type of damage as well as to
the force causing the damage. Equating an automobile accident to a
shipwreck, the court found a congressional intent to permit a deduction
for damage to property used by the taxpayer as a means of private
transportation. 8
The next expansion of the definition of "other casualty" came in the
form of deductions for termite damage to private residences. In
United States v. Rogers,9 termite damage was held to be merely an-
other form of deterioration, which is, of course, not deductible.'0
Drawing upon previous cases not involving termite damage, the court
noted:"
The similar quality of loss by fire, storm or shipwreck is in the sudden-
ness of the loss, so that the doctrine requires us to interpret the statute as
though it read "fires, storms, shipwrecks or other sudden casualty."
Rosenberg v. Commissioner2 was the first case permitting a casualty
loss deduction for termite damage to a private residence. Shortly be-
fore purchasing a house, the taxpayer had it inspected for termites.
Less than one year later termite damage was discovered, and the cost
of repair was deducted as a casualty loss. The commissioner's denial
of the deduction was upheld by the Tax Court.' The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Applying the suddenness test, the
court noted that "sudden" is a comparative term and held that damage
to Rosenberg's house, while not sudden when compared to damage by
fire, was sudden when compared to normal deterioration of the
building.'4
The dissent in Rosenberg emphasized the conceptual difficulties
arising from application of the "relative suddenness" doctrine announced
by the majority. 5 If deductions were permitted for all losses resulting
from deterioration that is more rapid than normal, there would be no
'Id. at 996.
1 i2o F.2d 244 ( 9 th Cir. 194i).
10Matheson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 54. F.zd 537 (2d Cir. 1931 ) .
1 i2o F.zd at 248.
22 198 F.zd 46 (8th Cir. 1952).
13 16 T.C. 136o (.95.).
"98 F.2d at 5o.
'
5
"Throughout, the whole thing [termite activity] is, as the Fay and Rogers
cases recognize, 'a gradual process,' and the damage done is 'not a sudden occurrence,'
within the concept of what constitutes, from its nature, mode of operation and character
of result, a 'casualty' force." 198 F.zd at 51 (dissenting opinion).
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conceptual problem. But, the Court of Appeals in permitting a deduc-
tion for the termite damage to the Rosenberg house approved prior
cases' 6 denying deductions for termite damage. As noted by the dis-
sent,17 if termite damage is a casualty loss, then it should be deductible
at whatever state of destruction the damge is discovered by the tax-
payer. 1
Since a deduction for "rapid" termite damage is now accepted by
the Internal Revenue Service,'19 it is difficult to understand how the
present position of denying a deduction for damage caused by rodents,
moths, and other pests can be maintained. 20  This is especially true in
that Revenue Ruling 55-32721 bases the denial of a deduction for moth
damage on United States v. Rogers, which has now been modified by
Rosenberg to permit a deduction if the damage is proven to have oc-
curred within the preceding year. However, in Burns v. United
States22 the taxpayer was denied a deduction for damage to trees result-
ing from an attack by disease-bearing beetles. The court, adverting to
the Rosenberg case, noted that the damage to the trees was discovered
within the specified time limit. Nevertheless, it held that this damage
was not within the definition of a casualty loss. As there is no valid
distinction between termite damage and damage caused by beetles,
it is believed that the court should have allowed the deduction.
The American Law Institute, reflecting what it believes to be the
1" United States v. Rogers, 12o F.zd 244 ( 9th Cir. 1941); Charles J. Fay, 42
B.T.A. 2o6 (1940), aff'd, zo F.zd z53 (zd Cir. 1941).
27 198 F.2d at 5x.
1" Cases subsequent to Rosenburg have allowed a deduction where the time within
which the damage occurred was relatively short. Alan M. Winsor, 28 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 335 (1959); Buist v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 218 (E.D.S.C. 1958); Leslie
C. Dodge, 25 T.C. 1022 (1956); Shopmaker v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 7o5
(E.D. Mo. 1953). But a deduction was denied where the taxpayer knew for several
years that the property was infested. Feinstein v. United States, 48 Am. Fed. Tax R.
1367 (E.D. Mo. 1954).
A practical reason for denying a deduction for damage occurring over a period
of several years is that allowance of the total deduction in the year of discovery might
give the taxpayer an undeserved advantage. However, this possibility could be elim-
inated by using something similar to the formula for back pay in reverse and limiting
the deduction to the smaller of the total of a pro rata deduction of the years of destruc-
tion or the total deduction in the year of discovery.
19 In Treas. Rel. TIR-I 4 2 (March 3, 1959), the Treasury states that it will allow a
deduction where a taxpayer shows that the damage is sudden.
10Edward W. Banigan, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 511 (1951) (rat infestation).
1 955-I CUM. BULL. 25.
22 174 F. Supp. 203 (N.D. Ohio 1959). 4ccord, Rev. Rul. 55-599, 1957-2
CUM. BULL. 142.
'Vol. 1961 : 440
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case law definition of "other casualty" has proposed that "other sudden
misfortune" be substituted for that term.= It is apparent, however,
that suddenness is not the common denominator of "other casualty."
For example, in Robert M. Diggs4 the txapayer was denied a deduc-
tion as a casualty loss for glassware and china broken by his maid. The
loss was unquestionably sudden. While a requirement that the loss
be sudden may circumscribe the applicability of the deduction, still the
problem of defining "casualty" or "misfortune" remains.
Another interesting aspect of the definition of "other casualty" is the
unwarranted addition of a requirement that the force causing the
damage be severe. In, Ray Durden25 the taxpayer was permitted a
casualty loss deduction for damage to his house caused by dynamite
blasts at a nearby quarry. The court emphasized that the blasts causing
the damage were unusually severe, not the normal blasting done at
the quarry. If damage to a residence resulting from dynamite blasts is
within the definition of other casualty, why should the intensity of the
blasts be material? The statute specifically refers to fire, storm, and
shipwreck but includes no requirement as to the magnitude of these
events. Cases emphasizing that the loss was deductible because it re-
sulted from the wettest month on record, 6 or the worst drought in the
century,27 make this same error. If the damage is of the type for
which a causalty loss deduction is permitted, the strength of the force
causing the damage should be immaterial.2
A related difficulty has occurred in the definition of the term
"theft," which appears to have been added to section i65(c)(3) as an
23 ALI, FED. INCOME TAX STAT. § Xisi(d) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1952).
' 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 384. (-959).
253 T.C. i (1944).
"
0Delbert P. Hesler, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mere. 9o (1954).
2 7 Buttram v. Jones, 87 F. Supp. 322 (W.D. Okla. 1943). See Rev. Rul. 54-85,
1954-1 CuM. BULL. 58.
"
2 The court in Ray Durden possibly believed that the taxpayer, by building a
home close to an operating quarry, assumed the risk of damage from normal blasting
operations. This should not have bothered the court, however, because negligence, un-
less it is "gross or willful," does not deprive a taxpayer of a deduction for damage to
his automobile. Treas. Reg. § i.165-7(3)(i), 2 CCH 196r STAND. FED. TAX REP.
1 1565. Therefore, unless the taxpayer's act of building in the vicinity of the quarry
is equivalent to "gross or willful" negligence, a deduction would be proper if the
damage is within the definition of other casualty.
The taxpayer's efforts to establish that the damage was caused by severe blasts were
not wasted because this at least served to fix the time of the loss. In addition, the mag-
nitude of the force causing the loss may be some evidence of the extent of the damage.
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afterthought.29  In general, the courts have adhered to a highly cir-
cumscribed definition of loss by theft and have refused a deduction
where the loss was occasioned by fraud. For example, in Hanes v.
Commissioner0 a taxpayer who paid $2,5oo for a painting that the
seller fraudulently represented to be an original attempted to deduct
the loss. The court denied the deduction, stating that this was not
"theft." From the taxpayer's standpoint there is no difference between
loss by theft and loss due to misrepresentation. This position also en-
joys conceptual support; modern legal commentators include both
misrepresentation and embezzlement within the definition of theft.,'
At the time section I65(c) was drafted, damage resulting from fire,
storm, or theft might have been particularly burdensome because of the
economic loss to the taxpayer. This is not true today because damage
resulting from these casualties is generally covered by insurance. In
contrast, losses that have been held to be nondeductible often are not
included in insurance protection. For example, mortgaged property
normally must be protected by insurance covering fire and storm dam-
age, but the mortgagor is seldom required to carry insurance covering
damage caused by termites, rodents, or other pests. Although floater
type theft insurance policies are not at all uncommon, there is little
insurance coverage for lost personal property. If alleviation of eco-
nomic losses was the rationale for allowing casualty loss deductions, the
judicial development of the concept has moved in the opposite direction
when the actual economic burden borne by the taxpayer is considered
in the light of the development of insurance coverage.
9 The provision for theft losses was not added until 1916. The statutory language
was: "Losses . . . arising from fires, storms, shipwreck, or other casualty, and from
theft." (Emphasis supplied.) Ch. 463, § 5 (a)(4), 39 Stat. 759.
202 T.C. 21 3 (.943).
32 PERKINS, ON CRIMINAL LAW 272 (1957): "In fact the distinctions between
larceny, embezzlement and false pretenses serve no useful purpose in the criminal law
but are useless handicaps from the standpoint of the administration of criminal
justice.... ." .4ccord, HALL, CASES AND READINGS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Ch. 3 0949).
The regulations have not precluded acceptance of this concept. Treas. Reg.
§ x.165-8 (3) (d), 2 CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 1570: "For purposes of
this section the term 'theft' shall be deemed to include, but shall not necessarily be
limited to larcency, embezzlement, and robbery." A recent Tax Court decision,
Michele Monteleone, 34 T.C. No. 73 (596o), permitted taxpayer a deduction for
$z8,ooo lost by false pretenses because under California law "false pretenses" is em-
braced under the statutory definition of theft. Accord, David H. Schultz, 3o T.C. 256
(958), rev'd on other grounds, 278 F.2d 927 (sth Cir. 196o); Edwards v. Bomberg,
231 F.2d 107 ( 5th Cir. 1956) ; Morris Plan Co. of St. Joseph, 42 B.T.A. 1290 (1940).
[Vol. i96x : 440
CASUALTY LOSS DEDUCTION
In view of the confusion surrounding the casualty loss deduction,
it is believed that a new statutory provision must be enacted if equitable,
predictable results are to be achieved. An inherent weakness in the
present statute is its attempt to define an economic loss in terms of the
force causing the damage; the emphasis is placed on the force producing
the loss rather than on the loss itself.
Possibly a deduction should be permitted for all permanent losses
to a taxpayer's investment. In terms of economic loss, no distinction
can be made between loss caused by moth damage and loss caused by fire.
Yet, under present law the moth damage is nondeductible.3 - Even
though all permanent losses may warrant a deduction, loss of revenue
and administrative difficulties would perhaps make such a system im-
practical. Therefore, it may be necessary to restrict the deduction.
Even under the present concept of casualty loss, the taxpayer seeking a
deduction is faced with additional difficulties which effectively restrict
the operation of the deduction.
AMOUNT DEDUCTIBLE
A taxpayer claiming a deduction must establish the amount of his
loss. Under the present rule, the amount of the deductible loss is the
difference between the value of the property immediately before and
immediately after the casualty, not to exceed its basis and diminished
by insurance or other compensation realized.3  This formula seems
32 Rev. Rul. 55-327, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 25.
"J. H. Anderson, 17 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 72T, 722 (1948): "(The measure of a
casualty loss on non-business property, deductible under [§ 165 (c)] . . . is the differ-
ence between the fair market values of the property immediately preceding, and immedi-
ately after, the casualty, but not in excess of the cost [i.e., adjusted basis] or March i,
19x3 value, and diminished by insurance [or other compensation] realized. Where
property has actually depreciated in value, depreciation should be considered in deter-
mining the value, regardless of the fact that it was not deductible for income tax
purposes in prior years." See Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 (1939). Generally
the adjusted basis of non-business property is the same as the unadjusted basis since there
is no adjustment for depreciation. Sears v. United States, 3 A.F.T.R.zd 997 (D.C.
Ohio 1959). For example, suppose that a house was purchased in 1945 for $io,ooo.
In x961 it is partially destroyed by fire. If, by competent appraisal, its value before
and after the fire is established to be $25,ooo and $i5,ooo respectively, $io,ooo may be
deducted, since the amount of the deduction is not greater than the basis (here cost)
of the property. As another example, suppose the appraised values before and after
the fire had been $z5,ooo and $ioooo respectively. In this situation the taxpayer's
deduction would be limited to so,ooo, since the deduction may not exceed the cost
of the house.
The deduction is also limited by the amount of insurance coverage on the property.
It should be noted that insurance recovery is not taken into account until the loss in
Vol. Ig61 : 4401
simple enough, but its implementation has proven exceedingly difficult.
The classic examples arose out of an ice storm. In one case the
taxpayer, owner of a farm covered with valuable forests, sought a deduc-
tion of $3,000, claiming that the value of the property before and after
the ice storm was $175,0oo and $172,ooo respectively. Testimony of a
licensed real estate broker corroborated the taxpayer's contention. The
District Commissioner offered no evidence as to value, contending that
there was no basis for the claimed deduction. The deduction was per-
functorily disallowed.34 However, another taxpayer whose property
was damaged in the same storm was allowed a deduction on the basis
of testimony of a competent forester who carefully described the
damage to petitioner's shade trees. 5
As noted above, the deductible loss may not exceed the basis of the
property. However, where shrubbery and trees used for landscape pur-
poses are damaged, the courts have held that the deduction is deter-
mined by the resulting decrease in value of the entire estate. The only
apparent ceiling is the total adjusted basis of the property.8" An ex-
ample is the Louisiana case in which cedar trees surrounding the tax-
payer's home were killed by frost. The trees represented only a small
part of the purchase price of the land but appeared to have been worth
$17,000 to the total value of the estate. A deduction in that amount
was allowed, the court intimating that it thought the loss in value to the
property was even more than was claimed. 87
In determining the amount of a casualty loss, the fair market value
of the property immediately before and immediately after the casualty
should be ascertained by competent appraisal. However, the appraisal
must recognize any general market decline in order that the deduction
be limited to the actual loss resulting from the damage to the prop-
value is first determined as above. For example, if before and after values were
$2o,ooo and $5,ooo and the taxpayer had $8,ooo insurance coverage, the loss would be
limited to $2,ooo ($ro,ooo - $8,ooo maximum allowable) instead of $7,ooo (the actual
loss to taxpayer figured on the value estimates. $2o,ooo - $5,000 = $i5,ooo - $8,000
$7,000).
"Anne B. Richardson, x B.T.A. 576 (1925).
"'Whipple v. United States, 25 F.2d 52o (D.C. Mass. 1938).
"Harry M. Leet, 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 32 (1955), aff'd, 230 F.zd 845 (6th
Cir. 1956); Jay W. Howard, z8 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 359 (0959); S. F. Horn, 28
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 155 (1955); William 0. Lindley, 7. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 323
(.952).
37 United States v. Barret, 2oz F.zd 804 (Sth Cir. 1953). If the property is owned
as tenants by the entirety, the husband can deduct only one half of the loss. Gilbert 3.
Kraus, 2o P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 983 (.951).
[Vol. x961 : 440446 DUKE L.4.W JOURN.4L
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erty. 8 For example, if a storm generally depresses prices in a par-
ticularly area, this decrease in value may not be deducted as a casualty
loss.
In I955"' the Service ruled that while cost of repairs, restoration,
clearing up, or removing debris cannot be used as a measure of the loss,
value immediately after the casualty means the value before the prop-
erty is repaired, restored, or cleared up. Repair is only some evidence
to be considered along with expert appraisal. Some courts, however,
have expressed dissatisfaction with the before-and-after value test,40 and
determinations of loss based on cost of repair have frequently been
approved.41 For example, in Robert H. Montgomery42 a casualty loss
deduction based on the estimated cost of repair was allowed. The
court, noting that the value of the property before and after the loss
was a question of fact, chose to use the repair estimate rather than real
estate appraisers' estimates of market value.
The value test places a difficult, uncertain task on a taxpayer, and
the courts have often refused to accept the figures offered by him. A
greater degree of certainty and less costly litigation might result if the
lower of the cost of repairs or the cost of replacement were accepted.
However, the repair or replacement method of arriving at the amount
of a deductible loss is not a complete solution to the problems here.
For example, where there has been no actual repair, the taxpayer would
have to furnish a mere estimate, which would raise essentially the same
problems as do value estimates. The value method has been hammered
out through usage to a point where it is at least capable of uniform
application. The difficulty is in proof. Even this is not too great an
obstacle if the taxpayer does not content himself with hastily formed
estimates of value but buttresses his claim with carefully prepared
records of the loss. However, unless there is a sharp break with the
present case law, the most certain prediction of the amount of allowable
loss is the repair bill.
The requirement that the amount of the claim be supported by
38 West v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 259 F.2d 704 ( 3 d
Cir. x958).
IR-Cir. 55-11.
,0 See, e.g., Gilbert J. Kraus, zo P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 983 (195).
"E.g., W. F. Harmon, 13 T.C. 373 (.949).
42 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 66 (947) (damage to Florida estate by freeze). The
court while accepting testimony by both commissioner's and taxpayer's experts, chose
to allow the amount of replacement estimated by the gardener a few days after the
freeze.
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explicit proof of actual loss is also reflected in the limitation on the
deduction to losses of the taxpayer's own property. What does "prop-
erty" mean in this context?
THE PHYSICAL DAMAGE REQUIREMENT
A forest fire destroys the view from taxpayer's hillside residence.
His property is not damaged by the fire; yet, its value decreases because
the view is gone. Can the taxpayer deduct this loss in value?
Under the generally accepted rule, the answer is no because the
taxpayer's property has not been physically damaged. 3 Mere loss in
value does not entitle the taxpayer to a deduction. In West v. United
States44 the taxpayer owned a summer cottage on a lake owned by an
incorporated social dub of which she was a member. Use of the lake
facilities was a privilege of membership. A hurricane destroyed the
retaining dam, resulting in total destruction of the lake. The value of
taxpayer's property dipped sharply thereafter, and she attempted to
deduct the reduction in value as a casualty loss from the storm. The
deduction was denied because the loss of the lake was not a loss of
taxpayer's property, but a loss to the corporation. Similarly, it has been
held that devaluation of beach property due to a storm is not an allow-
able deduction where the decline in value does not result from physical
damage caused by the storm, but is caused by fear of future storm dam-
age on the part of prospective buyers.45
The physical damage requirement produced an absurd result in
Citizens Bank of Weston v. Commissioner.40  After a flood inundated
the basement of taxpayer's property, the bank was forced to dis-
continue use of the basement for the storage of important records and
files. In effect, an important part of the building became virtually
worthless with a concomitant decrase in the building's value. Yet, the
court denied the deduction. In this case the taxpayer would necessarily
make expenditures to insure safe storage facilities for its records. Al-
though an economic loss was suffered as a result of the flood, prior cases
gave the court ample authority for requiring that actual physical damage
accompany a deductible loss47
Even though the statutory language does not explicitly require
"
3 W. S. Dickason, 2o B.T.A. 496 (1930) 5 Samuel E. Mulholland, x6 B.T.A. 1331
(i9z9); B. M. Peyton, 1o B.T.A. ix29 (1928).
" 163 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 259 F.2d 704 ( 3d Cir. 1958).
" Frank P. Kendall, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 695 (1958).
40 25z F.2d 425 (4 th Cir. 1957).
"E.g., C. W. Stoll, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 685 (x946).
[Vol. 1961 : 440
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actual physical damage to the taxpayer's property, the case law was fairly
consistent in this respect until the unheralded case from Mississippi,
Stowers v. United States.48 There, a taxpayer sought to deduct loss of
value to his property caused by a slide of a river bank near the tax-
payer's home which damaged a city street normally used by the tax-
payer to reach his property. Although the property was not physically
damaged, a deduction was allowed. The court repudiated the require-
ment of physical damage, stating:49
The question arises as to how . . . [plaintiff's property] . . . was dam-
aged in so large amount if the physical property was not affected. Such a
damage arises because the residence was no longer useful .... It is funda-
mental that land has no value aside from the use that might be made of it.
Plaintiff's residence was rendered useless and, without access from a street
... its value was destroyed.
Under the Stowers case the taxpayer in the above hypothetical
situation might be permitted a deduction since the destruction of the
view resulted in an economic loss to the homeowner. However, the
decision raises far more problems than might first appear. Under this
case, the entire Florida Keys could be devalued and a deduction taken
by landowners because of partial destruction of the overseas highway.
And yet it is apparent that the "losses" here are only temporary. The
situation presented in the Stowers case is strikingly similar. The road
in'that case will probably be rebuilt, restoring any loss previously de-
ducted. An interesting question might then arise as to whether the
taxpayer would be required to include the increase in the value of his
property due to the restoration of the road in his taxable income.
It appears that there are two reasons for the physical damage require-
ment. First, it is possibly an application of the general rule that a loss
is not deductible unless actually sustained. For example, it is well
settled that a taxpayer may not take a deduction for loss in value of
securities." Unless the stock becomes completely worthless there
must first be some transfer of the stock, usually a sale, which will
definitely fix the amount of financial loss.5 ' The courts have perhaps
AS 169 F. Supp. 246 (S.D. Miss. 1958 ) .
"Id. at 248. (Emphasis added.)
" W. P. Davis, 6 B.T.A. 1z67 (1927)3 E. 0. Walgren, 4 B.T.A. io66 (1926);
Chicago Ry. Equip. Co., 4 B.T.A. 452 (1926); Augustus C. Adams, i B.T.A. 983
(1925).
"1 A deduction may be allowed even though the stock has not been transferred if the
taxpayer can prove that the stock has become completely worthless. C. E. Conover
Vol. i96x : 440]
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felt that in the absence of actual physical damage a claimed loss is too
speculative to meet the requirement that it be actually sustained. The
second reason for requiring physical damage would seem to be judicial
distrust of before-and-after value estimates. The cases indicate that a
deduction is allowable only where there is some dear-cut financial loss
that can be tied to the probable out-of-pocket expense to a taxpayer as
a result of a casualty. One court even denied a deduction for damage
done to taxpayer's automobile by salt water, noting that the claimant
was still operating the unrepaired car.52 Yet, under the valuation test
this factor is completely immaterial.
CONCLUSION
The present statutory provision allowing the deduction of casualty
losses is at best vague and difficult to apply. As a result, the courts are
given little specific guidance in determining whether a particular loss
falls within the concept of "other casualty." The resulting body of
case law that has developed from diverse judicial interpretation of the
statute provides little aid to the taxpayer who is required to bear the
expense and inconvenience of litigating a contested deduction. The
Internal Revenue Service, having largely accepted the courts' confused
piecemeal implementation of the statute, has failed to dispel the un-
certainty here.
The confusion and inequity surrounding this statutory provision
stems from the difficulties inherent in application of a test of deducti-
bility that seeks to define a deductible loss in terms of the force pro-
ducing the loss rather than the loss itself. The Code in requiring that
a deductible loss result from an uncompensated "casualty" causes the
issue of deductibility to turn on the definition of a term unfamiliar to
the common law and not defined by statute. Consequently, the courts
are given no guideposts in their efforts to define the scope of the de-
duction.
In view of the labyrinth produced by the operation of the present
statute, it is believed that a new section should be enacted. To achieve
a measure of equality, the question of deductibility should be answered
in terms of the losses for which a deduction will be permitted rather
than the force causing the loss. Under optimum conditions the tax-
payer might be allowed to deduct all economic losses sustained, except-
Co., 7 B.T.A. 1234 (1977). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § x65 (g). See generally,
2 CCH 1961 STAND. FFD. TAx REP. 1555.
"' Edward W. Banigan, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 511 (1951).
[Vol. i96i: 440
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ing only losses resulting from the taxpayer's willful destruction of his
property.5 ' However, the resulting loss of tax revenue might make
such an omnibus deduction unfeasible.-"
Admittedly, there is no easy solution to the problems presented by
the casualty loss deduction. Yet, the haphazard, illogical coverage of
the present deduction demands that a legislative effort be made to de-
lineate the purposePI and operation 6 of the casualty loss deduction.
" Such a result could be achieved by repealing § 165(c). If this were done, the
only applicable provision would be the general rule set out in § i65(a), which allows
a deduction for "any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by
insurance or otherwise." An exception disallowing deduction of losses caused by the
taxpayer's willful destruction of his property undoubtedly would be read into the statute
by the courts.
"As an alternative "solution? to the problems presented here, Congress might repeal
only the third subsection of § t65(c), thereby limiting deductible losses to those "in-
curred in a trade or business" (§ 165(c) (i)) and those sustained in "any transaction
entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade or business' (§ 165 (c) (z)).
Keeping in mind the maxim that deductions are "a matter of legislative grace," an
even more drastic "solution" would be repeal of § 165 in toto.
" If the statute included some indication of the policy factors that contribute to the
allowance of a deduction here, the courts would perhaps be able to develop a theory of
casualty loss deduction.
" If the statute were amended to strike the term "other casualty," the problem of
defining deductible losses would subsist. It is believed that the most feasible solution
here would be to retain the general rule of deductibility found in § 165(a) and in-
corporate subsections providing for specific exceptions. Thus, if "legislative grace"
does not include allowance of a deduction for the value of mislaid or lost property,
Congress should so state. While problems of interpretation and construction would still
exist, the relative certainty that would result commends this task to Congress.
